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CASENOTES
STANDING-STATES LACK STANDING AS Parens Patriae TO
CHALLENGE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS ACTS OF FEDERAL OFFI-
CIALS. Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
Parens patriae' is a seldom used theory of standing which allows a state
government to bring suit on behalf of its citizens. States may always sue
to protect their own proprietary interests, but parens patriae standing enables
them to represent their citizens' interests as well. While these actions may
be brought against private entities2 and other states,3 states have tradition-
ally been denied parens patriae standing in actions against the federal govern-
ment.4 Although there have been significant attempts to narrow this broad
federal exemption,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, in Pennsylvania v. Kleppe,6 recently held that the federal gov-
ernment continues to enjoy immunity from state parens patriae actions.
1. Translated literally: "parent of his country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (antitrust rate-
fixing violations); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (discharge
of fumes across state lines).
3. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (diversion of waters);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (state statute restricting exports);
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (diversion of waters); Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208 (1901) (discharge of sewage into river).
4. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Supreme Court held that
a state lacks parens patriae standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal
statute because the federal, not the state, government is best able to represent the
citizens as parens patriae. Id. at 486. Subsequent lower court decisions have held
that a state lacks parens patriae standing to challenge the actions of federal officials as
well as the constitutionality of federal statutes. In Minnesota ex rel. Lord v. Benson,
274 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1960), Minnesota brought suit as parens patriae to challenge
a milk marketing order by the United States Department of Agriculture. The court
held that the action was barred by Mellon. See also Public Util. Comm'n v. United
States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966); Idaho ex rel.
Robson v. First Security Bank, 315 F. Supp. 274 (D. Idaho 1970); Wisconsin v. Zimmer-
man, 205 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wis. 1962).
5. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has allowed a state regulatory
commission parens patriae standing to challenge the administration of a federal statute.
See Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975).
6. 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Casenotes
Pennsylvania had brought suit against the Small Business Administration
(SBA) alleging that its designation of the state as a "Class B" disaster area 7
in the wake of Hurricane Agnes constituted arbitrary and capricious conduct
As parens patriae, Pennsylvania sought to vindicate the wrongs done to its
citizens resulting from the SBA's alleged misconduct.9 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the action, holding
that Pennsylvania lacked standing to sue. 10  On appeal, Pennsylvania
launched a headlong attack on the breadth of the federal exemption, arguing
that it applies only when "abstract questions of political power" are raised."
The appellants claimed that, although a state may not challenge the power
of the federal government by questioning the constitutionality of a federal
statute, it may challenge the arbitrary and capricious acts of federal officials.
This distinction was premised on the theory that a constitutional attack seeks
to circumvent congressional intent, whereas an attack on the administration
of a statute seeks instead to comply with the congressional will. 12  Further-
more, Pennsylvania asserted that there was no longer any reason to maintain
the traditional federal exemption from parens patriae actions.'8 Pointing
7. The differences between a "Class A" and "Class B" designation lie in the
administration of the relief effort. A "Class A ' disaster area is administered from
Washington, D.C., while a "Class B" area is administered by the Regional Adminis-
trator. 36 Fed. Reg. 7290 (1971). The level of assistance provided to a "Class A"
area is no greater than that provided to a "Class B" area. The harm suffered by
Pennsylvania, and the reason for the suit, is not readily apparent. However, in
seeking to enjoin discontinuance of the relief effort, Pennsylvania alleged that the
designation had been made to promote the "personal political aspirations" of the de-
fendant, Thomas S. Kleppe, Administrator of the Small Business Administration.
Preliminary Statement of Plaintiff at 5, Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, Civil No. 74-9 (D.D.C.,
filed Aug. 12, 1974).
8. Brief for Appellant at 5, Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
9. 533 F.2d at 671.
10. Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, Civil No. 74-9 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 12, 1974). The
court's reasoning was not explained, as Judge William B. Jones dismissed the case
for lack of standing without discussion.
11. Brief for Appellant at 10, Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
12. This argument was buttressed by the fact that Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923), involved a constitutional, rather than an administrative, challenge. See
note- 4 supra.
13. Pennsylvania argued that Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), should
not be followed due to "the passage of time and the concomitant expansion by judicial
decisions of what interests a State may properly protect suing as parens patriae." Brief
for Appellant at 14, Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Penn-
sylvania was referring to a general expansion of the state's parens patriae functions.
See text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
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to recent Supreme Court decisions generally expanding the rights of organi-
zations to sue on behalf of their members,' 4 appellants reasoned by analogy
that the same policy considerations should apply when a state seeks to
represent its citizens in actions against the federal government.
The District of Columbia Circuit, however, unmoved by either Pennsyl-
vania's arguments or a contrary decision by the Ninth Circuit, 15 held that
Pennsylvania was barred from suing the federal government.' 6 Admitting
at the outset that "this case beckons us into one of the least well-illuminated
corners of a legal area,"' 17 the court analyzed the relevant case law and con-
cluded that the federal government should continue to be exempt from state
parens patriae actions. Of primary importance to the majority was the
smooth functioning of the government. The court cautioned that parens pa-
triae suits by states against the federal government would disrupt federal
powers' s and undermine the necessary separation of state and national parens
patriae functions, 19 thereby impairing longstanding federalist principles.
Judge Lumbard 20 dissented from the majority opinion. Apparently impressed
with Pennsylvania's arguments, he found the distinction between constitu-
tional and administrative challenges to be crucial in that administrative chal-
lenges are intended to force compliance with congressional intent. 21 More-
over, from a policy perspective, he saw no reason why Pennsylvania should
not be allowed to act as parens patriae of its citizens, despite the presence
of a federal defendant. 2
2
14. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
15. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975).
See note 5 supra. WUTC was decided on January 20, 1975, shortly after Pennsylvania
had filed its brief in Kleppe (December 13, 1974). Although the Kleppe court did take
notice of WUTC, appellants urged a rehearing on the case, arguing that the same
considerations which led the Ninth Circuit to its decision in WUTC should apply in
Kleppe. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Pennsylvania
v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The petition was denied, with Judge Lum-
bard dissenting from the denial. Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, Civil No. 74-1960 (D.C.
Cir. May 3, 1976).
16. 533 F.2d at 680.
17. Id. at 670.
18. Id. at 678.
19. Id. at 680.
20. Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (Supp. IV, 1974). See
533 F.2d at 669.
21. 533 F.2d at 682 (Lumbard, J., dissenting). A constitutional challenge is "clearly
and obviously a fundamental threat to the federal sovereign power; [an administrative
challenge] seeks only to vindicate the will of the people as it has been expressed by
their duly elected representatives in the national legislature." Id.
22. Id. at 682-83.
[Vol. 26:168
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I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE Mellon DOCTRINE
In feudal times, the sovereign's parens patriae prerogative extended only
to those citizens who lacked legal capacity, such as infants and incom-
petents.23  In this country, the concept has been expanded to allow
the state to stand as a representative of its citizens, even though these citizens
have legal capacity. However, due to a fear of potential double recovery,
there is a reluctance to recognize parens patriae claims if the affected individ-
uals are themselves able to bring suit. 24  Accordingly, the state must assert
a "quasi-sovereign" interest common to most, if not all, of its citizens, 25 an
interest "in which the State as the representative of the public, has an interest
apart from that of the individuals affected."'26 Cognizable quasi-sovereign
interests were first limited to the health, welfare and safety of a state's citi-
zens, 27 but have since been expanded to include the economy of a state.
28
States were first allowed to assert these quasi-sovereign interests in 1900.29
Subsequently, numerous states sued as parens patriae in order to invoke the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.80 Although the Court entertained
original state parens patriae claims against other states
8 ' and private entities,8 2
it refused to do so in actions in which the federal government was the defend-
ant. In Massachusetts v. Mellon,8 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
suing on behalf of its citizens, challenged the constitutionality of the Mater-
nity Act of 1921.34  The Supreme Court, per Justice Sutherland, applied
23. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). For an interesting
discussion of the legal and historical foundations of parens patriae standing, see Malina
& Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65
Nw. U.L. REV. 193, 197 (1970).
24. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
25. Malina & Blechman, supra note 23, at 209.
26. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).
27. Malina & Blechman, supra note 23, at 203.
28. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
29. In Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900), Louisiana was granted parens patriae
standing to challenge a Texas quarantine regulation "because the matters complained of
affect her citizens at large." Id. at 19.
30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides: "In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction." Thus by alleging damage to a quasi-sovereign
interest, and thereby suing in its own name as parens patriae, a state was able to
bring its case directly to the Supreme Court.
31. See note 3 supra.
32. See note 2 supra.
33. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
34. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224.
19761
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the most basic principle of federalism to reach its decision: in cases of con-
flict, the federal government is supreme.35 The Court reasoned that a state
can not represent its citizens as parens patriae vis-6.-vis the federal govern-
ment because the federal government is itself the parens patriae of those
same citizens. It would be a logical anomaly for two sovereigns, both of
whom claim to represent the best interests of the same set of citizens, to
be suing each other. Since the federal government is supreme, the state
government must be denied parens patriae standing.
36
Nevertheless, the Court did not hold that all parens patriae actions against
the federal government are barred. It implied that there may be occasions
when a state may properly intervene to protect the rights of its citizens.
3 7
The opinion did not elaborate on the acceptable limits of such suits, and the
Court has not done so since then. However, lower courts, interpreting
Mellon broadly, have extended federal immunity from parens patriae suits
beyond Mellon's limited holding.38 For example, in Minnesota ex rel. Lord
v. Benson,39 the same federalist considerations used to decide Mellon were
held to bar parens patriae challenges to the administration of a federal stat-
ute. In general, the Mellon doctrine immunizes from state parens patriae
actions not only federal statutes, regulations, and orders, but also the conduct
and decisions of federal officials acting in their official capacity.
35. See generally Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 86.
36. [Ilt is the United States, and not the State, which represents them as parens
patriae, when such representation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and
not to the latter, they must look for such protective measures as flow from
that status.
262 U.S. at 486.
37. We need not go so far as to say that a State may never intervene by suit to
protect its citizens against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts
of Congress; but we are clear that the right to do so does not arise here.
Ordinarily, at least, the only way in which a State may afford protection to
its citizens in such cases is through the enforcement of its own criminal
statutes, where that is appropriate, or by opening its courts to the injured
persons for the maintenance of civil suits or actions.
Id. at 485.
38. See note 4 supra.
39. 274 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1960). In a parens patriae suit to have an administra-
tive order by the United States Secretary of Agriculture declared unlawful, the court
stated:
[t]he United States rather than Minnesota occupies the relationship of parens
patriae to those who are said here to be adversely affected or aggrieved by
this order issued by the Secretary in his capacity as an official of the United




There have been exceptions to the general rule, however. In Guam v.
Federal Maritime Commission,40 the District of Columbia Circuit allowed
Guam parens patriae standing to seek review of an FMC-approved rate
increase. The court stated that Benson was limited to suits challenging
actions by the federal government itself and did not apply to cases which
involved private utility operators. 41 Although the court asserted that there
was a long line of utility cases which had allowed states standing to chal-
lenge rate increases, all cases cited in support of this proposition involved a
statute that specifically conferred such standing.42 Guam has accordingly
been the basis of a utilities regulatory exception to the otherwise complete
bar of the Mellon doctrine.
43
The Supreme Court itself has departed from its holding in Mellon on two
occasions. In New York v. United States,44 New York, joined by other
states, sought to invalidate an Interstate Commerce Commission order alleged
to discriminate against shippers and receivers of freight in certain regions of
the country. The district court found that New York had standing because
its proprietary interests as a shipper and receiver were directly affected by
the order. 45 However, the court went on to say that the state also had
parens patriae standing and could maintain this suit on behalf of its citizens.
4"
The Supreme Court proceeded to the merits of the case without mention-
40. 329 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Guam alleged that the rate increases granted
by the Federal Maritime Commission were unlawful and that its citizens "whose very
existence is predicated on the ocean freight supply line" would be aggrieved by the
Commission's order. Id. at 252.
41. An identical result had been reached earlier in Puerto Rico v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 288 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1961), although there was no discussion of standing.
42. 329 F.2d at 252-53. The court cited California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 296
F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 482 (1962), and numerous
other cases involving the Federal Power Commission. However, the court's reliance on
this line of cases is misplaced because the Natural Gas Act provides for state standing
to challenge Federal Power Commission orders. 15 U.S.C. § 717r (1970).
43. See Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Washington
Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975).
44. 331 U.S. 284 (1947).
45. New York v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 856, 872 (N.D.N.Y. 1946), alf'd, 331
U.S. 284 (1947).
46. But all the States who are parties are political entities which are also
regions or districts within the rate-making territories involved and they are
directly affected as such and have an interest in behalf of their citizens and
communities above and apart from the rights of any particular shipper or
receiver of freight to a continuance of existing rates or the maintainance of
others. This . . . gives these States standing to sue as parens patriae to
preserve or enhance the welfare of their citizens by securing to them the
proper administration of federal laws ....
1976]
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ing the standing issue. It is mere speculation, therefore, whether the
Court rejected, ignored, or even accepted the district court's deviation from
the Mellon doctrine.
The Supreme Court's decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,47 however,
did depart significantly from the Mellon doctrine. South Carolina sought
to contest the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 196548 and, by
bringing suit in its own name, was able to take its case directly to the Su-
preme Court. 49  The state alleged that the Act violated the due process
clause of the fifth amendment 50 and the bill of attainder clause of article 15
in that the state was adjudged guilty of violation of the Act without trial.
The Court dismissed these contentions because the state was not a "person"
and therefore could not assert these claims.52  Only the citizens of South
Carolina, as "persons," would have standing to press the claims. Since the
state was the sole plaintiff, it was necessarily attempting to assert the
"personal" rights of its citizens. The Court noted that South Carolina's only
basis for standing was as parens patriae of its citizens and stated that these
claims were barred by Mellon.53  But the Court then turned its attention to
what it referred to as the basic question of the case,5 4 which was whether
Congress had exceeded its authority under the fifteenth amendment, 55 and
proceeded to consider this issue on the merits, thereby according South Caro-
lina an apparent de facto parens patriae standing. There was no indication
as to why the Court allowed standing on the fifteenth amendment issue
but not on the other claims.
56
47. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970).
49. See note 30 supra.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in relevant part: "No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .. .
51. Id. art. I, § 9 provides in part: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed."
52. 383 U.S. at 324.
53. "Nor does a State have standing as parent of its citizens to invoke these consti-
tutional provisions against the Federal Government, the ultimate parens patriae of
every American citizen." Id.
54. The objections to the Act which are raised under these provisions may
therefore be considered only as additional aspects of the basic question pre-
sented by this case: Has Congress exercised its powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment in an appropriate manner with relation to the States?
Id.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I provides: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
Id., amend. XV, § 2 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation."
56. Professor Bickel has severely criticized the Court for its course of action in
[Vol. 26:168
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The Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington Utilities & Transportation Com-
mission v. Federal Communications Commission (WUTC)5 7 was the first
case to state that the Mellon doctrine did not apply to parens patriae
actions involving the conduct of federal officials. The Washington Utilities
& Transportation Commission, as an agency of the State of Washington,
sought review of a final FCC order authorizing the construction of a new
communications common carrier route by a certain corporation. WUTC
asserted standing as parens patriae to represent the citizens of the state who
stood to be harmed by an increase in telephone rates which would allegedly
result from the FCC's order. Although the FCC argued that parens patriae
standing was barred by Mellon, the court disagreed,58 stating that Mellon
applies only when the state raises questions which involve a "'distribution of
powers between the State and the national government.' "9 Furthermore,
the court said that the Mellon doctrine may have been " 'eroded by time.' -0
Noting the Supreme Court's de facto grant of parens patriae standing in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the opinion cautioned that Mellon is now a
doctrine of questionable authority.61
II. THE VALIDITY OF THE Mellon DOCTRINE
In Kleppe, Pennsylvania sought to exploit these prior departures from the
Mellon doctrine. 2  The state advanced the same arguments and cited the
Katzenbach. See Bickel, supra note 35, at 87-89. Professor Wright has stated that
Katzenbach casts doubt on the Mellon holding and that "the Court's failure to explain
why the state has standing to raise the Fifteenth Amendment objection but not the
others is mystifying." C. WRiGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 503 (2d ed. 1970).
See also Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970). Noting the Katzenbach opinion,
Justice Douglas argued that Mellon's authority had been "eroded by time" in his dissent
from the Court's denial of leave to Massachusetts to file a complaint challenging the
constitutionality of the Vietnam War. Id. at 889 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial
of leave to file complaint).
57. 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975).
58. The Ninth Circuit also found that the Washington Utilities & Transportation
Commission had standing to sue as a proper party under the "injury in fact" and "zone
of interest" requirements of Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 513 F.2d at 1151. Therefore, the court was not com-
pelled to find parens patriae standing in order to allow the Commission to maintain
the action.
59. 513 F.2d at 1153, quoting Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 445
(1945).
60. 513 F.2d at 1154 n.16, quoting Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 889
(1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of leave to file complaint). See note 56
supra.
61. "It would be improvident to extend a doctrine that is of questionable authority
in its original application." 513 F.2d at 1154 n.16.
62. Appellants were unable to incorporate the Ninth Circuit's decision in WUTC
1976]
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same authorities used by the Ninth Circuit to justify its decision in WUTC.63
These arguments, however, met with considerably less success in the District
of Columbia Circuit. The court downplayed the significance of those cases
departing from Mellon, concentrating instead on the language used in Guam
and Katzenbach which, the court claimed, served to reaffirm the authority
of the Mellon doctrine.
0 4
Although the Kleppe court carefully stated that it expressed no support
for the WUTC decision, 65 it attempted to distinguish WUTC by limiting it
to cases involving a specialized utility regulating agency.66 The court rea-
soned that this specialization "arguably befits it to stand in a parens patriae
capacity" 67 because the agency could conceivably be the "best available
representative of the plaintiff interests involved." 68  To the Kleppe court,
this distinction had the additional advantage of explaining its own decision
in Guam, which had allowed parens patriae standing in a case involving
utilities regulation. 69  This appears to be a distinction without a differ-
ence. It is unclear why agencies regulating utilities, and these agencies
alone, may maintain parens patriae suits against the federal government.
In Kleppe, the court said that the agency's expertise in the field and the close
interaction of federal and state regulation "renders less substantial the federal-
into their argument because their brief was filed prior to this decision. But see note
15 supra.
63. In addition, the appellants in Kleppe asserted that Mellon was distinguishable
because it dealt with federal action affecting rights "held in common with all other
citizens in the United States," Brief for Appellent at 19, whereas the federal action
in question in Kleppe affected only the citizens of Pennsylvania. Therefore, Pennsylvania
would stand as a more proper party to assert the rights of its citizens than did
Massachusetts in Mellon. The Kleppe court, however, did not address itself to this
distinction.
64. 533 F.2d at 678 n.55. The court also distinguished the decision in New York
v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947), as a case in which other states appeared before
the Supreme Court, some with the appellant State of New York, and some with the
appellee United States. Therefore this case could have appeared to the Court as a
controversy between states, in which case parens patriae representation by New York
would have been proper, since the federal government was not the sole defendant.
533 F.2d at 677 n.55.
65. "Without expressing any view as to the propriety of that decision, we note it
is distinguishable from our case. . . ." 533 F.2d at 681.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court stated that WUTC could further be distinguished because the
Ninth Circuit had found a proprietary basis of standing and therefore "the parens
patriae basis may be nonessential to the court's holding." Id. n.67. See note 58 supra.
68. 533 F.2d at 681.
69. "It has also been suggested that utility cases raise specially compelling arguments
in support of state standing." Id. n.68, citing Guam v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 329
F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But see note 42 supra.
[Vol. 26:168
Casenotes
ism interest in freedom from state intrusion."70 Left unexplained was why
this expertise and close interaction has any less of an effect upon federalism.
But even accepting, arguendo, the theory that parens patriae suits by special-
ized state agencies do not impair federalist doctrines, there is reason to be-
lieve that the application of this theory in Kleppe would have resulted in a
finding that the plaintiff had standing. The court ignored the fact that the
Secretary of Community Affairs was a named plaintiff in the suit. The
Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs is arguably a specialized
state agency capable of maintaining a parens patriae action against the
federal government. Accordingly, the only difference between WUTC and
Kleppe is that WUTC involved a utilities commission. There appears to
be little reason to grant standing to the former, while denying it to the latter.
Of primary concern to the Kleppe court was the: basic rationale under-
lying the Mellon decision. Specifically the court focused on the "proper allo-
cation of authorities within the federal system."' 71 To the court, the issue
was federalism and not the potential limitations of the Mellon line of cases.
Since an individual is a citizen of two governments-state and federal-it
follows that each government should act as parens patriae within its separate
jurisdictional area. 72 When conflicts arise, the federal sovereign interest
predominates, due to the supremacy of the federal government, over any
state quasi-sovereign interest. 78  This reasoning is both logical and efficient;
it avoids a disruption of federal authority74 and prevents states from engaging
federal agencies in costly litigation.
7 5
Despite the legal symmetry of this federalist principle, there are profound
policy implications in denying states the opportunity to assert the rights of
their citizens against the federal government. Significantly, many arbitrary,
capricious, and even unconstitutional actions of the federal government will
remain unchallenged due only to the lack of an appropriate or willing plain-
tiff. Although certain agency decisions affect great numbers of citizens
70. 533 F.2d at 681.
71. Id. at 676.
72. Id. at 677.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 678.
75. After the district court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D.
Hawaii 1969), rev'd, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972)
allowed the state parens patriae standing to sue for damages to its economy under the
antitrust laws, other states hastened to file complaints alleging damage to their economy.
See generally State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits
for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 411 (1970). This is an indication that states
would also be quick to bring parens patriae actions against the federal government if
the bar of Mellon were relaxed or abandoned. Overloaded courts are doubtless- aware
of this fact.
1976]
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as a group, these decisions may have only a minor effect upon each individual
citizen. A good example of such agency action is a rate increase by a federal
regulatory commission. The individual impact is so small that potential
plaintiffs are apt to forego legal action.
The adoption of class action suits76 was specifically aimed at remedying
such a situation. But the Supreme Court's recent decision in Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin77 promises to curtail sharply the number of future class ac-
tions, especially those which could otherwise be represented by the state
as parens patriae.78  Therefore, in many instances, the state, as parens
patriae, is now the only plaintiff willing and able to assert claims which,
although insignificant on an individual basis, are huge in the aggregate. The
combined effect of Eisen and Kleppe is effectively to preclude redress of any
such claims against the federal government. 79
It is by no means clear why Mellon should continue to bar parens patriae
actions against the federal government in the future. Mellon rests on the
proposition that the federal government is parens patriae supreme; however,
as a practical matter, it is difficult to understand why and how the federal
government is better able than state governments to assert the citizens'
interests.80 It would be more appropriate to grant parens patriae standing
to that sovereign best able to act in this capacity.81
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
77. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Eisen held that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(c)(2) each class member who is reasonably identifiable must be notified of the
class action. The effect of Eisen is to impose a huge cost burden on the organizers
of large class actions.
78. In order to sue as parens patriae, the state must assert a quasi-sovereign interest,
something common to a majority of its citizens. The class of citizens which the state
can represent as parens patriae, then, is very large. Similarly, the classes of citizens
most seriously affected by the Eisen decision are also those which are very large.
79. The Supreme Court has addressed itself to the fact that the denial of parens
patriae standing may cause certain wrongs to remain unremedied. In Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), it said that class actions were preferable to parens
patriae actions to remedy the wrongs of large numbers of citizens. 405 U.S. at 266.
This, however, was before the Court restricted the effectiveness of class action suits in
Eisen. Furthermore, Congress has recently passed legislation intended to nullify the
Hawaii decision, which had restricted the use of parens patriae antitrust suits. See
Pub. L. No. 94-435 (Sep. 30, 1976). This law specifically authorizes states to
bring parens patriae treble damage antitrust actions.
80. In the petition for rehearing, Pennsylvania, citing the tenth amendment, argued
that the Kleppe decision "severely intrudes upon the sovereignty of all states, which
sovereignty co-exists with that of the federal government, but which, in matters of state
cognizance, is superior to the federal government." Petition for Rehearing and Sugges-
tion for Rehearing En Banc at 9, Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
81. There was support for this proposition in Kleppe. In distinguishing WUTC, the
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The basic purpose of Mellon was to safeguard the principles of federalism
by strengthening the federal government vis-d-vis the states. But today,
that decision is arguably jeopardizing the federal system because the federal
government may have become too strong.8 2 It is performing more and more
functions with the concomitant intrusion into areas once considered solely
within the sovereignty of the states. Federal power has eclipsed state pow-
er, and a readjustment of this power balance is necessary. The Supreme
Court is aware of this fact, and last term, in National League of Cities v.
Usery,as served notice that it is re-evaluating federalist doctrines.8 4 It is
conceivable therefore, that the Court may choose to review the Mellon
doctrine, especially in light of the conflict between the District of Columbia
and Ninth Circuits.85
III. CONCLUSION
Mellon need not be a doctrine carved in stone.8 6 Parens patriae, as a
court indicated that the utility regulating commission may have been entitled to maintain
the parens patriae suit because it was the best available plaintiff. 533 F.2d at 681.
82. The appellants in Kleppe alluded to this argument: "Recent abuses teach that
to provide the federal government with immunity from suit is not good policy and
would be violative of the principles of 'Our Federalism.'" Plaintiff's Points and Au-
thorities In Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss This Action at 5, Pennsyl-
vania v. Kleppe, Civil No. 74-9 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 12, 1974).
83. 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). The Court held that Congress could not apply minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and
municipal employees because the provisions would interfere with the functions per-
formed by the sovereign state and local governments.
84. "[There are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which
may not be impaired . . . because the Constitution prohibits [Congress] from exercising
the authority in that manner." Id. at 2471.
85. There is now a direct conflict between the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit . . . . The likelihood of a
Supreme Court resolution of the matter has been very much enhanced as a
result of this judicial clash.
Strausberg, The Standing of a State as Parens Patriae to Sue the Federal Government,
35 FED. B.J. 1, 19 (1976).
86. Raoul Berger has argued that there is no historic reason to require a personal
interest in a public action.
IThe notion that the Constitution demands injury to a personal interest as a
prerequisite to attacks on allegedly unconstitutional actions is historically
unfounded . . . . Public suits instituted by strangers to curb action in excess
of jurisdiction were well established in English law at the time Article I was
drafted.
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement? 78 YALE
L.J. 816, 840 (1969). But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Broderick, The
Warth Optional Standing Doctrine: Return to Judicial Supremacy? 25 CAmn. U.L. REv.
467, 530 n.333 (1976).
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common law doctrine, is amenable to judicial expansion and, in general, has
been expanded in recent years. As a strictly legal matter, Mellon still stands
as a bar to parens patriae actions against the federal government. In this
context, the Kleppe decision better interprets existing case law than does the
Ninth Circuit's decision in WUTC. However, Mellon appears to have out-
lived its usefulness, and, in light of recent developments in both law and gov-
ernment, a judicial reassessment of this time honored doctrine is needed.
John B. Williams
SECURITIES LAW-Intent to Deceive, Manipulate, or Defraud
Must be Alleged in a Private Action for Damages Under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
The elements which must be alleged in a private civil action' for damages
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and Securities
and Exchange Commission rule lOb-53 have been alternatively expanded and
1. An implied civil action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), was first recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). It is now well established that a private cause of
action may be brought for a violation of section 10(b). See Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,
343 F.2d 902, 903 (10th Cir. 1965).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Section 10(b) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(emphasis added)
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). SEC rule lob-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
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narrowed by the courts throughout the history of the Act. While earlier
cases required allegations of the elements of common law fraud,4 later ones
relaxed the traditional requirements in order to further the remedial pur-
poses of the federal securities laws.5 However, the trend to construe sec-
tion 10(b) expansively has recently yielded to a narrower interpretation of
the provision.6 This concern for limiting the scope of section 10(b), which
has become one of the most litigated antifraud provisions, 7 has been reaf-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,s which held
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice, to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
4. The elements of an action for common law fraud (tort action in deceit) are:
False representation of fact, knowledge or belief that the representation is false (scien-
ter), intent to induce the plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation, justifiable reliance by
the plaintiff, and damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance. W. PROSSER, THE
LAw OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
5. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (proof of
reliance is not necessary where the facts withheld are material and where there is an
obligation to disclose); SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 463 (2d
Cir. 1968) (Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969) (common
law fraud is no longer the outer limit of liability under rule 10b-5, but rather the
rule is closer to unfairness than to what lawyers and laymen think of as fraud);
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) (privity
between plaintiff and defendants is not necessary). For a discussion of the reasons
for the expansive reading of rule 10b-5, see A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW, FRAUI>---
SEC RULE 10b-5 § 12.8, at 281 (1967).
6. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the doctrine expressed in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), that only an actual purchaser or
seller of securities may maintain a private action for damages under section 10(b) and
rule lob-5. Although the Court recognized that this limitation on standing will preclude
some valid claims, it felt that important policy considerations justified a limitation on
the number of potential plaintiffs. 421 U.S. at 737-49. The Court also seems to be
interpreting other federal securities laws in a highly restrictive fashion. In Foremost-
McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 432 U.S. 232 (1976), the Court held that
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which was designed to prevent a
beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of a corporation's stock from realizing short-
swing profits on the basis of inside information, applies only to those who were such
owners before the purchase in a purchase-sale sequence.
7. A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 2.5, at 45-46. Other general antifraud
provisions include section 1l(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1970); section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970); section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1970) and SEC rule 15c
1-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1976).
8. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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that an allegation of an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the part
of a defendant is a necessary element of a private action for damages.
The plaintiffs in Ernst & Ernst were customers of First Securities Company
of Chicago, a small brokerage firm. Lester Nay, the president and majority
stockholder of First Securities, had persuaded them to invest in "escrow" ac-
counts which later proved to be spurious. The defendant, Ernst & Ernst, an
independent certified public accounting firm, was the auditor for First Securi-
ties during the time of the fraudulent transaction. In its audit, Ernst
& Ernst failed to inquire into the nature of the "mail rule" which Nay had
established in order to effect his fraudulent scheme. Nay had required that
all mail addressed to him at the firm was to be opened by him alone. The
plaintiffs sought damages from Ernst & Ernst9 under rule 10b-5 for aiding
and abetting Nay's fraud by the firm's negligent failure to discover this
irregular practice. They claimed that the accounting firm had negligently
failed to follow proper auditing procedures that would have led to the discov-
ery of the fraudulent scheme.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted Ernst &
Ernst's motion for summary judgment 1° after finding that the accounting
firm had conducted the audits according to generally accepted accounting
standards." Although the court accepted the standard of the profession as
the requisite standard of conduct, it rejected Ernst & Ernst's argument that
an allegation of negligence was insufficient to support a 1Ob-5 aiding and
abetting claim.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court,' 2 holding that a cause of
action for aiding and abetting a 1Ob-5 securities fraud will lie when the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant had a duty of inquiry and disclosure,
that the defendant breached this duty, that the plaintiff would have been
benefitted had the duty been performed, and that there was a causal con-
nection between the breach of duty and the facilitation of the underlying
fraud. Although the court found a statutory duty of inquiry and a related
duty to disclose material irregularities, it remanded the case for a determi-
nation of whether a failure to uncover the "mail rule" was a breach of the
duty of inquiry and disclosure and whether there was a causal connection
9. During receivership proceedings against First Securities, which began after Nay
had committed suicide, all but two of the plaintiffs asserted claims based on the accounts
and were given relief. The court held Nay liable as a primary perpetrator of the
fraud and First Securities as an aider and abetter. SEC v. First Securities Co.,
463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
10. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 350 F. Supp. 1122 (N.D. 111. 1972).
11. The courts are in conflict as to whether compliance with generally accepted
accounting standards is sufficient to avoid accountant liability. See note 64 infra.
12. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
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between the breach of this duty and the facilitation of the fraudulent opera-
tion.
13
In reversing the court of appeals' decision, the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff must allege scienter on the part of a defendant in order for an
action to lie in a lOb-5 private claim for damages. Writing for the majority,
14
Mr. Justice Powell found that the language of section 10(b) definitively sup-
ports a scienter requirement. In dissent, Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by
Mr. Justice Brennan, conceded that the majority's analysis was technically
consistent but emphasized that this narrow interpretation would have a de-
leterious effect on the innocent public. Since the accountant's certification
could potentially cause investors great monetary loss, the dissent contended
that the accountant-defendant should be liable for both negligent and inten-
tional conduct.
I. NUMEROUS STANDARDS ARTICULATED BY THE
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is part of a network
of federal legislation that regulates securities trading for the purpose of
protecting investors and promoting standards of fair dealing. 15 Broad in
scope, it prohibits the use of manipulative and deceptive devices in the pur-
chase or sale of securities and confers administrative authority on the
Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate rules that will ensure
the effective prevention of fraudulent practices.1 6 In 1942, pursuant to its
administrative authority, the Securities and Exchange Commission promul-
gated rule 10b-5 to define further the nature of the proscribed devices.' 7
However, neither the enabling provision nor the administrative rule articu-
lates the requisite state of mind that makes the prohibited conduct actionable.
As a consequence, the courts have implied numerous standards.' 8 Using a
13. Id. at 1119.
14. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Marshall and Rehnquist joined
in the opinion with Mr. Justice Powell. This was the same majority that upheld the
restrictive Birnbaum doctrine in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975). See note 6 supra.
15. Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970) and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) as a
response to the fraudulent practices in the securities markets and the resulting stock
market crash of 1929. For a discussion of the purpose of the legislation, see H.R. REP.
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933) for the Securities Act of 1933; and S. REP. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) for the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
•16. See note 2 supra.
17. See note 3 supra.
18. Both the private civil action under section 10(b) and the scienter requirement
have been implied by the courts. See note 1 supra.
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common law fraud analysis, some early 10(b) private actions required an al-
legation of scienter. However, as the litigation developed the courts recog-
nized that federal securities laws must be construed liberally if congressional
intent to protect investors was to be accomplished. 19 Consequently some
courts modified or eliminated certain common law fraud requirements but
chose to retain some form of the element of scienter. Others adopted various
types of negligence standards in order to effectuate congressional purpose. 2°
The circuits which required scienter did not articulate one uniform stand-
ard. In Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,21 the Second Circuit refused to
entertain a 10(b) action "in the absence of allegation of facts amounting to
scienter, intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use
of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud. '22 The court unequivocally stated
that it would be insufficient to allege mere negligence. 23  Based on the Shem-
tob test, the Second Circuit in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.2 4 established a mini-
mum requirement of "willful or reckless disregard for the truth" 2 before
liability under rule 10b-5 would be imposed. Other circuits did not delineate
as carefully the requisite degree of intent. The Tenth Circuit confirmed
its adherence to a modified form of common law scienter by stating simply
that "there is required something additional by way of scienter or conscious
fault than mere negligence," but that neither common law intent to defraud
nor "odious or malicious" intent was needed.26  A similar position was
adopted by the Fifth Circuit which has declared that "some culpability beyond
mere negligence is required for liability."
'2
T
19. The scienter required in common law fraud was very hard to prove. A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 5, § 8.4, at 203.
20. The Second, Fifth and Tenth Circuits have embraced some form of a scienter
standard while the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have adopted negligence standards, and
the Ninth Circuit, a flexible duty standard. See notes 21-40 & accompanying text
infra. The Third Circuit has not addressed this specific issue. However, Judge Adams,
in a separate opinion in Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1972), carefully analyzed section 10(b), rule lOb-5, and the legislative and admin-
istrative histories, and stated that fraud or other culpable conduct is required. 458
F.2d at 276-78 (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting). For a good survey of the
standards in the various circuits prior to Ernst & Ernst, see Bucklo, Scienter and Rule
10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 562 (1972); and Ruder, Factors Determining the Degree of
Culpability Necessary for a Violation of the Federal Securities Laws in Information
Transmission Cases, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 571 (1975).
21. 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
22. Id. at 445.
23. Id.
24. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
25. Id. at 1306.
26. Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1007 (1975). Cf. Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973) (knowl-
edge of the falsity is required).
27. Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 622 (5th Cir. 1974); accord, Sargent v. Genesco,
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Those courts that established scienter standards for 10(b) private ac-
tions analyzed, to varying degrees, the purpose of federal securities laws,
the language of section 10(b), and the relationship between the various
sections of the federal securities laws. 28  Although the courts recognized
the need for a broad and flexible interpretation in this area, 29 they in-
dicated that the application of section 10(b) should be characterized by "re-
strained flexibility";30 that is a broad interpretation in order to effectuate
the remedial purposes of the statute, but one which does not extend liability
for negligent acts where there is no conscious fault or some type of scienter3 0
Those courts that analyzed the language of the section noted that the
operative terms of both the section and the rule-"manipulative or deceptive
devices," "fraud," "deceit," "purchase," "sale," and "security"-connote
intentional and affirmative conduct.8 1  Finally, the courts that consid-
ered the interrelationship of the provisions of the federal securities laws
maintained that the establishment of a negligence standard would enable
parties to establish a cause of action under section 10(b) when they would
otherwise be precluded by restrictions contained in other provisions.8 2
Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 761 (5th Cir. 1974); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579,
606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
28. The courts which have established scienter standards have not relied on any
factors in particular. See Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (remedial purpose of section 10(b) to prohibit fraud);
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (language of section 10(b),
remedial purpose of the statute, interrelationship of the sections of the statute); Shem-
tob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971) (no basis for its stand-
ard); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970) (remedial purpose of the
statute, language of section 10(b); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d
Cir. 1951) (interrelationship of the provisions of the statute).
29. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 592 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873,(1974); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 739 (10th
Cir. 1974); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 803 (5th Cir. 1970).
30. See Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1007 (1975).
31. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1305 (2d Cir. 1973); Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1970).
32. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 1-88 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), which pointed
out that a negligence standard would enable parties to circumvent the limitations
on the class of plaintiffs who may bring actions under section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). Section 11 provides a private action for dam-
ages resulting from a registration statement that includes untrue statements of material
facts or fails to state material facts. The provision may be used by only those parties
who purchase securities that are the direct subjects of the registration statement. See
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973), which reasoned that the
adoption of a negligence standard would nullify section 20 of the Securities Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970). This provision places liability on those persons who con-
trol any person liable under federal securities laws and who are in some meaningful
manner culpable participants in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled persons.
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A compromise approach to the rule 10b-5 state of mind issue was devel-
oped by the Ninth Circuit in White v. Abrams.3 3  Instead of articulating
either a scienter or a negligence formula, the court held that a flexible duty
standard should be applied to determine "the extent of the duty that rule
1Ob-5 imposes on the particular defendant. '3 4  The standard requires a
case-by-case analysis to determine whether a particular fact situation and the
relationship between the parties justifies imposing liability under the rule. 5
Negligence had been sufficient for civil liability under section 10(b) in
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits."6 In Tomera v. Galt,3 7 the Seventh Circuit
found that "Rule 10b-5 claimants need not plead nor prove scienter under
section 10(b) of the Act."' 8 It was sufficient for a plaintiff to provide a
brief summary of how the fraudulent scheme operated, when and where it
took place, and who were the participants. The Eighth Circuit had likewise
stated that "proof of 'scienter,' i.e., knowledge of the falseness of the impres-
sion produced by the statements or omissions made, is not required." 39
The circuits that had articulated negligence standards emphasized the
need to interpret federal securities laws liberally in order to accomplish
their remedial purpose. However, these courts cited cases which, while
articulating a negligence standard, do not provide a rationale to support such
a standard. In addition, SEC enforcement actions were used as author-
33. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
34. Id. at 734-35.
35. The duty would be determined by considering the relationship of the defendant
to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to information as compared to the plaintiff's,
the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's reliance, and the defendant's role in initiat-
ing the transaction. Id. at 735-36. The Ninth Circuit reiterated its flexible duty
standard in Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1975). For a critical view
of the flexible duty standard, see Forseter, Rule lob-5 Violations in the Ninth Circuit:
"I Know It When I See It.," 30 Bus. LAw. 773 (1975) and Loss, Summary Remarks,
30 Bus. LAw. 163 (1975).
36. There have been several proponents of the negligence standard among the com-
mentators. See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U.
Cm. L. REV. 824 (1965); cf. Bucklo, supra note 20, at 594-96. But see Meisenholder,
Scienter and Reliance as Elements in Buyer's Suit Against Seller Under Rule 10b-5, 4
CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 27 (1963).
37. 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975).
38. Id. at 508. The Seventh Circuit first considered the scienter issue in Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). The court appeared to embrace a negli-
gence standard in stating that "knowledge of the falsity or misleading character of a
statement and a bad faith intent to mislead or misrepresent are not required to prove a
violation of the statute . . . ." Id. at 637. See also Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461
F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972).




ity in the negligence standard cases, but since they involve different policy
considerations, they may not be clearly applicable to private damage actions.
40
II. THE SUPREME COURT STANDARD
Faced with a potpourri of standards which were, for the most part, vaguely
articulated and of questionable basis, the Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst, in
fashioning its standard, analyzed the language of section 10(b), the legisla-
tive history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the interrelationship of
the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and the administrative history of rule lOb-5. The Court opted for a
technical approach which appears logically based, but which omits an analysis
of the relevant prior case law. Although the Court stated that it did not dis-
cuss policy considerations, 41 it is evident that the basis of the decision in-
volved a policy determination of the proper balance between the pro-
tection of the investing public and the extent of liability to which professionals
should be exposed. The Court chose a middle ground that will limit the
liability of defendants to situations where there was intended fraudulent
conduct and will provide investors with some, although not complete, pro-
tection from harm. Although the Court recognized that it may be unfair to
impose liability on parties who have no knowledge of the misconduct, it
failed to consider that some defendants have special duties to investors which
when breached could cause harm to investors. 42 A broader reading of sec-
40. See 386 F. 2d at 735. The Eighth Circuit in Myzel relied on Dale v. Rosenfeld,
229 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1956), which was not a 10(b) action and did not discuss the
scienter issue; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), which contained no cita-
tions to support its holding that negligence is a sufficient standard of proof; and the
district court decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), which was limited to an SEC enforcement action. See also Tomera v. Gait, 511
F.2d 504, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1975). Moreover, each time a negligence standard has been
articulated, the conduct at issue would have been actionable under a scienter standard.
See Bucklo, supra note 20, at 563.
41. 425 U.S. at 214 n.33. In discussing why it would not analyze policy con-
siderations, the Court appeared contradictory. It reasoned that an analysis of the
policy considerations was unnecessary because the language of section 10(b) settled
the issue. Yet since the Court analyzed the legislative history of section 10(b), the
intent of the entire body of federal securities laws, the interrelationship of the provisions,
and the administrative history of rule lOb-5, it seems logical that the Court would also
have discussed policy considerations.
42. The duty of the accountant to the public, for example, may be derived from the
Restatement of the Code of Professional Ethics of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants. See note 63 infra.
One commentator also contends that a scienter standard is not as appropriate where
accountants are involved since those who will be paying the damages will be the firm
partners rather than innocent shareholders. Bucklo, supra note 20, at 596. However,
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tion 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 might have been more appropriate for the remedial
purpose of federal securities laws.
Not only did the Court interpret section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 narrowly,
holding that scienter is a necessary element of a private damage action, but
the standard itself-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud-is more nar-
row than any previously enunciated test.48  The narrow Ernst & Ernst test
does not include the knowing use of a fraudulent device or constructive in-
tent, i.e., reckless behavior, two elements that had previously been included
in standards articulated by the circuits.44
In deciding the scienter issue on the basis of the language of section 10(b),
the Court contended that it did not reject the broad remedial goals of the
legislation. Rather, it reasoned that since the individual provisions of the
legislation articulated independent standards of liability based on the nature
of the prohibited conduct, any analysis of the appropriate standard should
focus on the language of the particular section involved. The Court rejected
an "effect-oriented" approach 45 which would interpret the language in light
of the congressional objective of protecting investors and thus proscribe any
conduct, intentional or negligent, that would have the effect of defrauding
investors. Instead, the Court stated that the appropriate standard should be
gleaned from the dictionary definition of the words of the provision and from
their usage in the securities market. The 1934 edition of Webster's Inter-
national Dictionary was used as authority for the proposition that the words
"manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" "make unmistakable a congres-
sional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite different from negligence."' 46
Moreover, the Court indicated that the word "manipulative" is especially
it may be argued that ultimately the increased costs will not be paid for by the part-
ners but rather by the clients.
43. See notes 21-27 & accompanying text supra.
44. See notes 22, 25 & accompanying text supra.
45. The "effect-oriented" approach, which the Court rejected, refers to the SEC's
position that investor protection is the result which should be achieved by securities
laws. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 14, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976). Recently, the Court has not always given the SEC the deference usually
afforded an agency administering a statute. Cf. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provi-
dent Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232, 259 (1976). The SEC seems to be responding to
this posture taken by the Court. Cf. BNA SEC. REG. L. REP., May 26, 1971, at F-1
(No. 354).
46. 425 U.S. at 199. "Webster's Int'l Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines 'de-
vice' as '[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design: a contrivance; an invention;
project; scheme; often a scheme to deceive; a strategem; an artifice'; and . . . . 'con-
trive' in pertinent part is defined as '[t]o devise; to plan; to plot . . . [t]o fabricate ...
design'; invent .. . to scheme . . . . '[Mianipulate' as 'to manage or treat artfully
of [sic] fraudulently ..... " Id. at 199 nn.20, 21.
[Vol. 26:180
Casenotes
significant because it is a "term of art" which, when used in the securities
market, "connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive and
defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securi-
ties." 4
7
Having disposed of the issue, the Court nevertheless reviewed the legisla-
tive history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to determine whether
there was any support for a negligence standard. The Court admitted that
the congressional hearings and reports provided no guidance as to the scope
of section 10(b). However, the Court attached great significance to one
reference in the congressional hearings which described section 10(b) as
"a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices."'48 Noting that there was
only one specific reference to section 10(b) in the Senate report,49 the Court
nevertheless gleaned congressional intent to establish a scienter standard
from the Senate report's references to "manipulative devices" 50 and the
availability of a good faith defense in civil actions where fraudulent practices
are alleged. 5'
The Court then analyzed the interrelationship of the provisions of the
securities laws in response to the Securities and Exchange Commission's
amicus argument that a negligence standard in section 10(b) is supported by
the explicit requirement of willful conduct in other sections of the securities
laws. The Commission had contended that since section 10(b) does not
explicitly contain a scienter requirement it should not be interpreted to re-
quire more than negligent conduct. However, the Court pointed out that
Congress clearly indicated the type of conduct-intentional behavior, negli.
gence, or innocent mistake-that would be required under each provision
that provided civil liability in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.52  Citing section 11
of the 1933 Act 53 as an example, the Court countered the Commission's
argument by indicating that negligence standards are also expressly contained
in securities legislation. In addition, the Court noted that each of the civil
remedies contained in the 1933 Act that embraces a negligence standard is
accompanied by specific procedural limitations that are absent from section
47. Id.
48. Id. at 201, citing Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House
Comm. on interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
49. 425 U.S. at 204-05, citing S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934).
50. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934).
51. Id. at 13.
52. 425 U.S. at 207. The Court cited sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1, o (1970) and sections 9, 18, and 20 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, r, t (1970).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
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10(b). 54  Thus, an extension of liability under section 10(b) for negligent
conduct would enable plaintiffs to bring their claims under section 10(b)
rather than under the provisions containing procedural restrictions, thereby
making these carefully drafted limitations easily avoidable.
Finally, the majority considered the Securities and Exchange Commission's
contention that the language in subsections (b) and (c) of rule 10b-5 can be
plainly read as including both negligent and intentional conduct. The Court
admitted that subsections (b) and (c) of this rule55 "could be read as pro-
scribing, respectively, any type of material misstatement or omission, and any
course of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding investors, whether the
wrongdoing was intentional or not." 56 However, in contrast with its analysis
of section 10(b) of the statute, the Court did not base its interpretation on
the plain language of the rule. Instead the Court found support for a scienter
standard in the rule's administrative history. 7 In addition, the Court assert-
ed the controlling principle that the scope of the rule cannot exceed the
breadth of its enabling provision. Since the Court had already determined
that section 10(b) liability could not be established without scienter, any con-
trary interpretation of the rule was untenable.58
In contrast, the dissent adopted the "effect-oriented" approach, which
seeks to proscribe any behavior that results in injury to the innocent investor.
Mr. Justice Blackmun pointed out that the investor victim can be harmed by
negligent as well as intentional conduct. He reasoned that the language in
subsections (b) and (c) of rule lOb-5 which proscribes negligent and inten-
tional behavior is consistent with the Court's past recognition of the need for
a flexible interpretation of antifraud legislation. Returning to the court of
appeals' focus on the scope of an accountant's responsibility in a securities
setting, the dissent concluded that the accountant owes a duty to the public
and that a breach of this duty should be actionable under section 10(b). 59
54. 425 U.S. at 208-09. The Court referred to sections 11, 12(2), and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, 1, o (1970).
55. See note 3 supra.
56. 425 U.S. at 212-13.
57. The Court recounted the events surrounding the promulgation of rule 10b-5.
Id. n.32. The Court noted that the rule was drafted quickly after a situation involving
intentional conduct. As further support for its position that the rule requires scienter,
the Court stated that SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) and the Commission's
Annual Report of 1942 explained that the purpose of the rule was to protect investors
against fraud.
58. 425 U.S. at 214.
59. Id. at 218. The dissent asserted that Congress should enact further legislation
in order to vitiate the effect of the majority's decision and to carry out the purposes of




The Ernst & Ernst majority's rejection of an "effect-oriented" approach
will have a great impact on participants in securities transactions. Damaged
investors may now be left without a remedy against accountants,"0 aiders and
abettors, 61 and others who can potentially contribute to their harm.
62
60. Injured plaintiffs may, however, be able to obtain redress from accountants by
other means. The Court suggested that they might be able to maintain a cause of action
under section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1970) and
rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1976). 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.13. Section 17 pro-
vides in pertinent part that securities brokers or dealers must "make . . . and preserve
. . . such accounts . . . books, and other records, and make such reports, as the
Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors." Rule 17a-5 requires the auditing
firm to state in its certificate "whether the audit was made in accordance with gen-
erally accepted auditing standards [applicable in the circumstances]." Accountants are
subject to injunctive proceedings by the SEC under section 21(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). They also may be disciplined by the
SEC in proceedings under rule 2(e) of the SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2
(1976). Rule 2(e) provides in part that:
mhe Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of
appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by
the Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be
lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and
abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws ....
See In the matter of Tubber T. Okuda, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 170 (Jan.
27, 1975) (accountant temporarily suspended from practice before the SEC but later
given right to apply for reinstatement); In the matter of Arthur Andersen & Co., SEC
Accounting Series Release No. 157 (Jul. 8, 1974) (accounting firm censured by the
Commission and findings published); In the matter of Touche Ross & Co., SEC
Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974) (accounting firm censured, ordered
to adopt certain procedures, investigated and restricted as to undertaking of professional
engagements).
61. Although rule lob-5 does not specifically punish aiders and abettors, the courts
have recognized that actions may be brought against aiders and abettors of rule lOb-5
violations. For a comprehensive analysis of aiding and abetting cases, see Zabriskie v.
Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Saltzman v. Zern,
[1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP. 95,521 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Since the Court decided Ernst & Ernst on the issue of scienter it did not consider
whether an implied aiding and abetting action exists under section 10(b) or what the
necessary elements would be in such an action. 96 S. Ct. at 1380 n.7. However, the
Court suggested that it would imply such an action and that scienter would be one of
the requirements. First, the Court stated that all civil damage actions under the section
and the rule require an allegation of scienter. Second, the Court cited Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
989 (1970), where a defendant was found liable for providing affirmative and know-
ing assistance to a securities dealer who was engaged in violations of section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5. Third, the Court cited Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud
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In refusing to find liability based on a negligent performance of work, the
Court displays a greater concern for business interests than for the protec-
tion of the public.63  This marks a departure from the trend to hold
accountants and other professionals to a higher standard than is generally
required by the profession.
4
The decision has left several related issues unresolved. It is not clear
whether constructive intent may be implied when there is gross negligence. 5
Cases: Aiding and Abetting Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contri-
bution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 620-64.5 (1972), in which the author supports the
aiding and abetting doctrine and contends that liability under an aiding and abetting
theory requires proof that the secondary wrongdoer knew of the illegal act and gave
positive assistance to the primary defendant.
62. It has been suggested that this decision does benefit plaintiffs in one way. The
six year statute of limitations generally applicable to common law fraud suits in which
scienter is required would now seem to be applicable to antifraud suits under the federal
securities laws. BNA SEC. REG. L. REP., Mar. 31, 1976, at A-3 (No. 346).
63. However, the code of ethics of the accounting profession makes accountants
responsible to the public. The Restatement of the Code of Professional Ethics of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants provides that:
A distinguishing mark of a professional is his acceptance of responsibility
to the public ....
The ethical Code of the American Institute emphasizes the profession's
responsibility that has grown as the number of investors has grown, as the
relationship between corporate managers and stockholders has become more
impersonal and as government increasingly relies on accounting information.
Restatement of the Code of Professional Ethics of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 2 CCH AccourNTANcY L. REP. T 65,501 (1975).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (conformity with generally accepted accounting principles is no
defense to a criminal prosecution); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 95,660 (2d Cir. 1976)
(accountant's duty to investors is governed by the policy of securities laws that investors
must be provided with all the facts needed to make intelligent investment decisions).
Contra, Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank *v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455
F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972) (generally accepted accounting principles were a minimum
standard); Donovan Constr. Co. v. Woolsey, 358 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Ark. 1973) (normal
accounting procedures refute claim of fraud); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (accountants not held to a standard higher than that of the
profession). Commentators have written a number of informative articles on the topic
of accountant responsibility. See, e.g., Symposium on Accounting and the Federal Secu-
rities Laws, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1975). The professional responsibility of securities
lawyers is also an issue that has been receiving increased attention. See Lowenfels,
Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend
in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 412 (1974). The
subject of the October 1974 ABA National Institute was the responsibilities of lawyers
and accountants. See Proceedings-ABA National Institute-Advisors to Management,
Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAw. 1 (1975).
65. In a case decided after Ernst & Ernst, the Seventh Circuit found a defendant-bank
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In addition, the Court has not ruled on the state of mind that must be alleged
in an action for injunctive relief.66 However, the posture taken by the Court
seems to indicate that future decisions involving these issues and others
related to -the scope of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 may accord a narrow
interpretation to federal securities laws when a contrary analysis would
create potentially unlimited liability for defendants or would inexorably
broaden the class of potential plaintiffs. 67 Thus, it appears that the only
vehicle for full protection of the public will be through additional legislation.68
Merle Y. Waldman
liable under rule lob-5 for grossly negligent conduct. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.,
535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976).
66. The circuits have generally held that proof of scienter is not a required element
in SEC actions for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. See SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458
F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180 (1963). But see SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 908 (1975). For a discussion of the policy considerations involved in providing
different requirements for private damage actions and injunctive suits, see Judge
Friendly's much cited concurring opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring) and Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5,
69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1969). After the Ernst & Ernst decision was handed
down, the Office of the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission
sent a memorandum to its staff attorneys which contained advice for avoiding the
effect of the decision in Commission injunctive proceedings. BNA SEc. REG. L. REP.,
May 26, 1976, at F-i (No. 354). Nevertheless, one district court has read Ernst &
Ernst to require scienter in a suit for injunctive relief brought by the SEC. SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); cf. SEC v. World Radio
Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
67. Although the Ernst & Ernst Court did not analyze policy considerations, it did
note that a negligence standard would create an undue broadening of the class of
plaintiffs who may sue under section 10(b). 425 U.S. at 214-15 n.33. The Court
pointed out that the concern for a broadening of the class of potential plaintiffs was
also expressed in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) and
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
68. See note 59 supra.
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